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Unfair Competition in Use of Corporate Names
John P. Diamond*
T IS WELL SETTLED that the law will give equitable protection
to the prior appropriator of a corporate name against a subse-
quent unauthorized use by a junior corporation.' In most
states statutory recognition is given to the property right2
which a corporation acquires in its own name, usually in the
form of a prohibition against another corporation choosing a
name the same as or deceptively similar to that of the prior
incorporator. 3 Although it has been suggested by one author
that the courts should give broader effect to the statutes,
4
nevertheless the great majority of the cases are decided under
the common law rules of unfair competition.
Unfair competition involving the use of a similar name is
a tortious act,5 and has been variously defined as a course of
dealing by which one attempts to deceive the public and palm
off his goods or services as those of another,6 to divert the trade
* B.M.E., M.M.E., Cornell University; Contract Administrator at Thompson-
Ramo-Wooldridge, Inc., of Cleveland; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
I White Tower System v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp.,
90 F. 2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 41, 302 U. S. 720, 82 L. Ed.
556; Standard Oil Company of New Mexico v. Standard Oil Company of
California, 56 F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1932); Rennolds v. Airport Advertising
Co., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 585 (D. Del. 1948); and see 1 Oleck, Modern Corpo-
ration Law, c. 19 (1958).
2 Standard Oil Company of New Mexico v. Standard Oil Company of
California, supra n. 1.
3 For example, Smith-Hurd Ill. Anno. St. (Perm. Ed. 1954) ch. 32, sec. 157.9.
West's Anno. Calif. Codes, Corporations, sec. 310: "The Secretary of State
shall not file articles which set forth a name which is likely to mislead the
public or which is the same as, or resembles so closely as to tend to deceive,
any of the following:
(a) The name of a domestic corporation.
(b) The name of a foreign corporation which is authorized to transact
business in this state.
(c) A name which is under reservation for another corporation."
Model Business Corp. Act, sec. 4, in 9 Unif. Laws Anno. 52, 60 (1951). For
statutes of all states see 1 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, c. 19 (1958).
4 Trimble, Corporations-Effect of Statutes on Similarity of Corporate
Names, 44 Ky. L. J. 439 (1956).
r Fry v. Layne-Western Co., 282 F. 2d 97 (8th Cir. 1960).
6 Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Shops, 221 Mich.
548, 191 N. W. 939 (1923); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company of Texas, 185 F. Supp. 895 (E. D. Ark., W. D. 1960).
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of a competitor, 7 or to obtain a free ride on the reputation,
good will, or advertising of another.8
Some confusion has arisen with respect to the relation of
trade marks, trade names, and corporate names. Generally
speaking, a trade mark is applicable to a salable article, its
function being to identify a product, while a trade name
identifies a particular business. Thus it is seen that a corpo-
ration's name may easily become its trade name 9 and its trade
mark if the name is used to designate particular goods. One
can, of course, enjoy the benefits of a registered trade mark
even though the mark is not associated with claimant's corporate
name. 10
A corporation may have and become known to the public
by more than one name through use or reputation, and all such
names will be given equitable protection. 1 In any event, if
confusion should arise as to whether the name is a corporate
name, trade name, or trade mark, the name will be protected.
Names Subject to Protection
Not all names are subject to protection. Words which
merely indicate the character or locale of a business do not
vest the corporation with an exclusive right to such name, since
to do so would deny the necessary or proper use of such name
to others doing a similar business in the same locality.' 2 How-
ever, equitable protection will be given to a name, even though
it consists of words in common use taken from the public domain,
where such name has acquired a secondary meaning. 13 Secondary
7 Schwartz v. Television Center, Inc., 189 F. 2d 691, (D. C. Cir. 1951);
Beneficial Loan Corporation v. Personal Loan and Finance Corp., 100 F.
Supp. 838 (E. D. Ark., W. D. 1951); Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works
v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 95 F. 2d 448 (7 Cir., 1938); 59 S. Ct. 191, 305 U. S. 315,
83 L. Ed. 195, rehear, den. 59 S. Ct. 356, 305 U. S. 675, 83 L. Ed. 437.
8 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, Inc., 20 F.
Supp. 703 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
9 Application of Walker Process Equipment, Inc., 233 F. 2d 329 (cust. and
pat. app. 1956); Gault v. Wagner, 227 Md. 521, 177 A. 2d 691 (1962).
10 Omag Optik und Mechanik A. G. v. Weinstein, 85 F. Supp. 631 (S. D.
N. Y. 1949). For the effect of registering a corporate name with the U. S.
Patent Office under the Federal Trade-Mark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)
see 6 Fletcher, Cyc. of Law of Private Corporations, sec. 2441.1 (Perm. Ed.).
11 B. Di Medio and Sons, Inc. v. Camden Lumber and Millwork Co., 23
N. J. Super. 365, 93 A. 2d 45 (1952).
12 Burnside Veneer Corp. v. New Burnside Veneer Co., 247 S. W. 2d 524
(Ky. 1952).
13 The National Shoe Stores Company v. The National Shoes of New York,
Inc., 213 Md. 328, 131 A. 2d 909 (1957); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline
Cochrane, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861 (S. D. N. Y. 1962).
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meaning is an association formed in the minds of the public
between the goods or services of an individual or corporation
and its name, mark, or symbol. Any subsequent appropriation
of such name, mark, or symbol is likely to create confusion in
the minds of the public and to divert trade from the prior
appropriator. 14 In an action for unfair competition, the plaintiff
is permitted to rely on the efforts of his predecessor in business
to show that a secondary meaning has attached. 15
The difference between unique and distinctive names and
merely descriptive words was pointed out in North American
Aircoach Systems, Inc. v. North American Aviation, Inc., 6 where
it was said
The courts have made the distinction between "strong"
and "weak" marks or names. Names "fanciful" in character
are denominated "strong." These are designations which
are generally not descriptive of the business, the persons
involved or the place of business or operation. "Weak"
marks are words of common speech and those descriptive
of the locality or area where the services are performed or
the article used or made.
Where commonly used words are connected in a distinctive
manner the right to equitable protection arises. Thus the words
"universal" and "credit" when combined to form the name of
an automobile finance company are unique and their subsequent
use by another company engaged in a similar business will be
enjoined.' 7 Similarly, where a bank used the word combination
"National City" as a part of its trade name for nearly a century
it acquired a property right in the words through long public
association with the bank and a newly organized window clean-
ing corporation was enjoined from using such words in its
corporate name.' 8
14 Schwartz v. Television Center, Inc., Beneficial Loan Corporation v.
Personal Loan and Finance Corp., Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v.
Nu-Enamel Corp., supra n. 7.
15 Speed Products Co., Inc. v. Tinnerman Products, Inc., 179 F. 2d 778
(2d Cir. 1949); Home of the Week, Inc. v. Associated Press, Inc., 178 F.
Supp. 460 (D.R.I. 1959).
16 231 F. 2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1955); See also Executive Employment
Service, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 258 (E. D. Pa.
1960).
17 Universal Credit Co. v. Dearborn Universal Underwriters Credit Corp.,
309 Mich. 608, 16 N. W. 2d 91 (1944).
18 National City Bank of Cleveland v. National City Window Cleaning Co.,
180 N. E. 2d 20 (Ohio App. 1962).
Jan., 1963
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The use of generic terms which are common to or char-
acteristic of a general class of business usually will not be pro-
tected. In an action by a carpet company to enjoin the use of a
similar name by a competing business it was held that the word
''carpet" is a generic term applicable to all in the same business
and thus not entitled to protection. 19 Similarly the words
"thruway" and "motel" are in the category of general, de-
scriptive or geographical words which ordinarily are not subject
to exclusive appropriation, although it was indicated in the
opinion that if words denoting a specific location were used, the
name would be protected.20 Other names held generic in nature
and thus not subject to exclusive use are "Day and Nite
Cleaners," 21 "Sports Show," 22 and "General Industries Com-
pany." 23 It is possible that a name which was initially fanciful
and thus subject to protection may, through custom and usage,
become generic. 24
Geographical names are not ordinarily subject to exclusive
use,25 but they will be protected when their use has acquired a
secondary meaning, 2 if their use by a junior business created
actual or probable confusion 27 or if there is intent to deceive.28
19 Carpet City, Inc. v. Carpet Land, Inc., 335 P. 2d 355 (Okla. 1958).
20 Thruway Motel of Ardsley, Inc. v. Hellman Motel Corp., 170 N. Y. S.
2d 552 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cty. 1958).
21 Poulos v. Carter, 200 Okla. 325, 193 P. 2d 591 (1948).
22 Dwight Lydell Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America v. Loeks,
329 Mich. 342, 45 N. W. 2d 311 (1951).
23 General Industries Co. v. 20 Wacker Drive Bldg. Corp., 156 F. 2d 474,
(7th Cir. 1945), cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 370, 329 U. S. 792, 91 L. Ed. 678, rehear.
den. 67 S. Ct. 480, 329 U. S. 832, 91 L. Ed. 705.
24 Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 165 F. Supp. 747
(N. D. Ill. 1958); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845
(D.N.J. 1952), affd. 206 F. 2d 114, cert. den. 74 S. Ct. 106, 346 U. S. 867, 98
L. Ed. 377.
25 Burnside Veneer Corp. v. New Burnside Veneer Co., supra n. 12; See
also Note, 30 Iowa L. R. 120 (1944).
26 Gano v. Gano, 203 Ga. 637, 47 S. E. 2d 741 (1948); Harrelson v. Wright,
339 S. W. 2d 712 (Tex. 1960).
27 Kreisberg v. Wakefield Co. Inc., 165 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (Special Term 1957);
Belvidere Land Co. v. Owen Park Plaza, Inc., 362 Mich. 107, 106 N. W. 2d
380 (1960).
28 Lincoln Center for Performing Arts, Inc. v. Lincoln Center Classics,
Record Soc., Inc., 210 N.Y.S. 2d 275 (Special Term 1960).
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Use of One's Own Name
The use of one's own name in a corporate title may be
enjoined in a proper case.29 Where such use is made in good
faith, the courts are faced with the dilemma of affording pro-
tection to the prior user of the name without impairing the
inherent right of an individual to do business under his family
name. 3" The problem is often resolved by permitting the corpo-
rate defendant to continue using the offending name, but re-
strictions are imposed on advertising so the public is not misled.
Typical restrictions include printing the offending word in the
same size and style of lettering as the remainder of defendant's
corporate name,31 or specifically disclaiming any relation to the
prior user.32 In cases where it appears that defendant's motive
was fraudulent such use will be enjoined absolutely. 33 In any
event the second user may not affirmatively do anything to cause
the public to believe that his goods are those of the first user
and he must exercise reasonable care to prevent the public from
being misled.
3 4
Where one adopts a new family name 3 5 or changes its spell-
ing to coincide exactly with that of a competitor such that there
is likelihood of appropriating the good will and reputation of the
prior user, protection will be granted. 3 6 In a recent Michigan
decision an injunction was granted to prohibit a corporation from
changing its name to "Taylor Company," even though the sur-
name of all its stockholders was Taylor, because such change
would result in confusion between plaintiff and defendant cor-
porations dealing in similar products in the same territory.3"
29 For a review of the earlier cases see Note, The Use of One's Own Name
as Unfair Competition, 26 Col. L. R. 870 (1926); Note, Trade Names and
Unfair Competition, 18 Tenn. L. R. (1944).
30 Anno., 44 A. L. R. 2d 1156 (1955).
31 Crane Co. v. Crane Heating and Air Conditioning Co., 299 F. 2d 577
(6th Cir. 1962); Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horlick, 143 F. 2d 32 (7th
Cir. 1944).
32 Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Gamlen, 79 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
33 Sentco, Inc. v. McCulloh, 68 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1953).
34 Kay Jewelry Co. v. Gay's Jewelry, Inc., 277 S. W. 2d 30 (Ky. 1955).
35 Societe Vinicole de Champagne v. Mumm, 143 F. 2d 240 (2d Cir. 1944).
36 J. B. Liebman & Co., Inc. v. Leibman, 135 N. J. Eq. 288, 38 A. 2d 187
(1944).
37 Taylor Supply Company v. Saginaw Hardware Company, 365 Mich.
576, 113 N. W. 2d 872 (1962).
Jan., 1963
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When a person suddenly goes into a business in which he has
no skill or experience using a name which has become valuable
in the trade, courts will recognize his fraudulent purpose and
enjoin the use .3
Where a family name has acquired a secondary meaning
in a particular area, the prior user will be protected against
a subsequent use of the name in the same locality.39 In a recent
Georgia decision where two brothers incorporated a business but
because of a disagreement one brother secured a charter for a
competing corporation, an injunction was denied to prevent the
use of the family name in the name of the second corporation.
40
When a minority stockholder who was president of a cor-
poration bearing his full name acquired practically all the
capital stock of a competing business in the same locality, and
changed the name of the second corporation to include his full
name, it was held that such use would not be enjoined in the
absence of aggravating circumstances leading to confusion be-
yond that arising from the mere similarity of names. The
court pointed out, however, that it was incumbent on the indi-
vidual to reasonably inform the public that he had severed his
connection with the first corporation.4
Use by a Rochester, Minnesota, drug firm of the name
"Mayo" in its corporate name will be enjoined even though the
first name of one of its incorporators was Mayo, where there
was a reasonable likelihood of confusion with the world famous
Mayo Clinic located in the same city.42 Similarly two entre-
preneurs named Aronberg and Podolsky will be enjoined from
using the initials "A&P" in their corporate name where the
obvious intent was to obtain a free ride on plaintiff's trade
name.
43
38 Robert Reis & Co. v. Herman B. Reiss, Inc., 63 N. Y. S. 2d 786 (Special
Term, 1946).
39 McCoy v. McCoy, 98 N. E. 2d 435 (Ohio Corn. P1. 1951); Holmes v. Border
Brokerage Co. Inc., 321 P. 2d 898 (Wash. 1958).
40 Coastal Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. W. G. Haupt, 214 Ga. 838, 108 S. E. 2d
277 (1959).
41 Carl Springer, Inc. v. Carl Springer Supply Co., Inc., 104 A. 2d 637
(Del. Ch. 1954).
42 Mayo Clinic v. Mayo's Drug & Cosmetic, Inc., 113 N. W. 2d 852 (Minn.
1962).
43 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, Inc., supra
n. 8.
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Actual Confusion or Injury
Ordinarily it is not necessary that actual confusion or de-
ception be shown; 44 it is enough if the use of a name by the
defendant is likely to cause confusion as to the source of the
products, or lead the public to believe that the business of de-
fendant is connected with the plaintiff's business. 45 The fact
of similarity alone is not sufficient to justify equitable inter-
vention in absence of proof of the likelihood of confusion.
46
The test to be applied in determining if the similar name
is likely to cause confusion is not whether the ordinary consumer
would be deceived after close examination, 47 but whether an
appreciable number of buyers possessing and exercising ordinary
prudence would be deceived.48  The courts will not protect the
prior user of a name where the confusion would arise only on
the part of the careless, the ignorant or the uninformed,49 al-
though in some instances protection is extended to the gullible
and the inexperienced.
50
Although actual competition between the parties is evidence
that confusion will result, absence of competition is not fatal
to the plaintiff's action. 51 It is not necessary to show that the
public has ever been misled into actually buying the products of
the alleged infringer.52 To establish unfair competition it is not
necessary that the trade name in question be familiar throughout
the entire public; it is enough if it is familiar to a substantial
portion of the public likely to use the plaintiff's services. 53
44 General Finance Loan Co. v. General Loan Co., 163 F. 2d 709 (8th Cir.
1947), cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 356, 332 U. S. 851, 92 L. Ed. 421.
45 National Van Lines, Inc. v. Dean, 288 F. 2d 5 (7th Cir. 1961).
46 Benrose Fabrics Corp. v. Rosenstein, 183 F. 2d 355 (7th Cir. 1961):
It is only when the use is dishonest or fraudulent that the court may
interfere: courts will not act where the only confusion, if any, results
from similarity of names and not from the manner of use (at p. 359).
47 H. Moffat Co. v. Koftinow, 232 P. 2d 15 (Cal. App. 1951).
48 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Liberty Insurance Co. of Texas, supra
n. 6; Rosso and Mastracco, Inc. v. Giant Food Shopping Center of Virginia,
Inc., 200 Va. 159, 104 S. E. 2d 776 (1958).
49 Yale University v. Benneson, 147 Conn. 254, 159 A. 2d 169 (1960).
50 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948).
51 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., 277 F.
2d 896 (7th Cir. 1960).
52 Speed Products Co. v. Tinnerman Products, Inc., supra n. 15; Schwartz
v. Slenderella Systems of California, Inc., 271 P. 2d 857 (Cal. 1954).
53 Industrial Photo Service, Inc. v. Kelly, 198 Cal. App. 2d 688, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 907 (1961).
Jan., 1963
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The gravamen of the common law action of unfair compe-
tition thus appears to be the use of the name of a business rival
which misleads the purchasing public, causing them to trade with
the first when they otherwise would have traded with the
second.
54
Generally it is not required that complainant offer proof of
actual injury or damage or that his trade has been diverted 55
because equity will give protection against the possible danger to
complainant's reputation which may result from the use of a
deceptively similar name.5 6 In the case of a charitable corpo-
ration which does not manufacture or sell goods, it is sufficient
if the use against which relief is sought would in all likelihood
result in loss of membership or impair its ability to raise funds.5 7
An action to enjoin the unauthorized use of a name cannot
be defended upon the ground that the defendant will suffer loss.
The damage suffered arises from the defendant's own folly in
deliberately incorporating under a name already in use.58 How-
ever where the plaintiff has committed laches, knowingly per-
mitting his competitor to build up a substantial trade, courts of
equity will not destroy the defendant's business.59
Necessity of Competition
Under the older cases it was usually necessary to establish
actual competition between complainant and the junior appropri-
ator before injunctive relief would issue. 0 However in the
leading case of Lawyers Title Insurance Co. v. Lawyers Title In-
54 Harrelson v. Wright, supra n. 26.
55 Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores, Inc., 228 P. 2d 436 (Idaho 1951); Wm.
Walker Co. v. Pocatello Monument Co., 230 P. 2d 701 (Idaho 1951).
56 Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 126 F. Supp. 737 (D. C. Conn. 1954), affd.
224 F. 2d 100.
57 Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden Slipper Restaurant and Catering,
Inc., 371 Pa. 92, 88 A. 2d 734 (1952).
58 National Circle, Daughters of Isabella v. National Order of Daughters
of Isabella, 270 F. 723 (2d Cir. 1920), quoted with approval in Independent
Nail and Packing Co., Inc. v. Perry, 214 F. 2d 670 (7th Cir. 1954).
59 The Seven-Up Company v. O-So Grape Co., 177 F. Supp. 91 (S. D. Ill.,
N. D. 1959); Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. 2d 822
(2d Cir. 1943).
60 Carroll v. Duluth Superior Milling Co., 232 F. 675, 146 C. C. A. 601 (8th
Cir. 1916); Regent Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Haaker, 75 Neb. 426, 106
N. W. 595, 4 L. R. A., N. S., 497 (1906); Sloan, Appropriating Another's
Trade Name for a Non-Competing Product, 25 Marq. L. R. 223 (1941).
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surance Corporation"1 this proposition was specifically denied, the
court stating that the concept of unfair competition was not
limited to mere similar or competing goods, but extends to any
act causing damage to the credit or reputation of the prior user.
The rule is now well established that the doctrine of unfair
competition extends beyond mere competing goods and services
to the misappropriation for the commercial advantage of one
person of a property right belonging to another; competition,
direct or indirect, is no longer an ingredient of unfair compe-
tition.6
2
Where there is no actual competition this fact may be taken
in evidence to show that the likelihood of confusion in the mind
of the buyer is correspondingly reduced,63 but where one seeks
to palm off his goods as those of another, there is no require-
ment of competition, since the likelihood of confusion is readily
apparent.
6 4
Where the parties are in competition but there is little possi-
bility of confusion, the use will not be enjoined. Thus where
customers of competing businesses were industrial steel users65
or department store buyers 66 the court found little likelihood of
confusion and the use was not enjoined.
Under the "dilution theory" enunciated in the New York
statutes6 7 injunctive relief will be granted if the proposed use
of a trade name is likely to dilute the distinctive quality of the
name, and it is not necessary to show competition between the
parties or even a likelihood of oonfusion as to the source of
61 109 F. 2d 35, 71 App. D. C. 120 (D. C. Cir. 1939), cert. den. 60 S. Ct.
806, 309 U. S. 684, 84 L. Ed. 1028.
62 O'Brien v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 293 F. 2d 1 (3rd Cir.
1961); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Insurance Co.,
supra n. 51.
63 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co.,
153 F. 2d 662 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 64, 329 U. S. 722, 91 L. Ed.
625, rehear, den. 67 S. S. Ct. 183, 329 U. S. 826, 91 L. Ed. 702, 67 S. Ct. 1526,
331 U. S. 868, 91 L. Ed. 1871; Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp.,
191 F. 2d 141, rehear, den. 191 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1951); Abramson v. Coro,
Inc., 240 F. 2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957).
64 Louisville Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 53 F.
Supp. 272 (W. D. Ky. 1943), motion den. 58 F. Supp. 950, modified 147 F.
2d 407; Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 141 F. Supp. 876 (D. Wyo.
1956), affd. 252 F. 2d 65, 76 A. L. R. 2d 600 (10th Cir. 1958).
65 Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 162 A. 2d 370 (1960).
66 Lorraine Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Loraine Knitware Co. Inc., 88 F. Supp. 634,
(N. D. Ga. 1949).
67 General Bus. L. sec. 368-d.
Jan., 1963
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the goods or services. 68 This proposition was expressly denied
in a recent case, where it was stated that the federal courts do
not recognize the New York dilution theory, and that the mini-
mum requirement for injunctive relief is that there be likelihood
of confusion as to the origin of the goods.69 However the dilution
theory was followed in Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Manu-
facturing Co.,70 where the court granted injunctive relief to the
magazine, prohibiting the slipper manufacturer from using the
word "Esquire" other than in its corporate name.
Territorial Limits on Protection
Under the older view that required actual competition be-
tween the parties to justify equitable intervention, 71 protection
would not be granted to a corporate name where the use com-
plained of was outside the geographical area from which com-
plainant drew his trade.7 2 The courts still recognize that reason-
able limitations must be placed on the territorial limits of pro-
tection,73 but with the ability of advertising media to create
national reputations and the free movement of the population
from one area to another the scope of such protection has been
considerably expanded. It is now well settled law that where
the complainant has established a national reputation the use
of the same or a similar name by a local enterprise will be en-
joined,7 4 although this is not the case where plaintiff's lack of
advertising in a particular locale has failed to establish the
requisite reputation.7 5
A large area of confusion exists with respect to the pro-
tection which should be afforded the trade and corporate names
of an expanding business. In the well known case of White Tower
68 Fancee Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 825
(S. D. N. Y. 1957).
69 Champion Paper and Fibre Co. v. National Association of Mutual
Insurance Agents, 148 F. Supp. 123 (D. D. C. 1957).
70 243 F. 2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957).
71 See cases cited supra, n. 60.
72 Carroll v. Duluth Superior Milling Co., supra n. 60; Charles Broadway
Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 F. 706, (2d Cir. 1924), cert. den. 45 S. Ct.
92, 266 U. S. 607, 69 L. Ed. 465.
73 Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F. 2d 696 (8th Cir. 1951).
74 Nagrom Corp. v. Cock 'N Bull, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 217 (D. D. C. 1957);
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, supra n. 50.
75 Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter Pan Diner, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 534
(D. R. I. 1957).
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System, Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp.,76
the court held that where a city was within the normal scope of
expansion of business of the prior user and such user had already
acquired good will in such city by use of advertising and the flow
of travel between the cities, the use of a similar name by a
competing business in such city would be enjoined. Conversely
where both an expanding business and a purely local enterprise
conduct their business under similar names, the larger business
will be guilty of unfair competition if it undertakes to expand
into the territory of the smaller business under the objectionable
name. 7 7 This proposition has led the courts to promulgate the
rule that where two users of the same or similar names occupy
essentially different territory, each is entitled to exclusive use
in his own territory against the other, regardless of which is
the earlier user.78 Thus where defendant had operated a restau-
rant in Los Angeles for several years prior to the time of trial,
and during that time plaintiff's "Pump Room" located in Chicago
gained a national reputation, and plaintiff sought to open a
"Pump Room" in Los Angeles, the defendant was enjoined from
using the name beyond a four mile radius of their present lo-
cation in Los Angeles. 79 In a similar California case, where
plaintiff Lerner Stores operated a national chain of stores and
had leased land in San Jose on which to construct a store, but
had failed to do so because of war time building restrictions, the
court refused to enjoin defendant's use of his family name
"Lerner" in the title of his store opened in San Jose after
plaintiff had leased the land. 0
Where the parties do not compete in the same territory, wide
separation is a fact to be considered in determining if there is
a likelihood of confusion.' Thus in the case of purely local
enterprises doing business in a particular neighborhood, injunc-
tive relief will be given in a proper case, but such relief is
usually confined to the particular district from which complain-
76 90 F. 2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 41, 302 U. S. 720, 82 L. Ed.
556. See Note, 22 Minn. L. R. 291 (1938); See also Quality Courts United,
Inc. v. Quality Courts, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 341 (M. D. Pa. 1956); D & W Food
Corp. v. Graham, 134 Cal. App. 2d 668, 286 P. 2d 77 (1955).
77 Kafafian v. Spotless Stores of New Jersey, Inc., 57 A. 2d 18 (N. J. 1948).
78 Smart Shop v. Colbert's, 250 S. W. 2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
79 Hotel Sherman, Inc. v. Harlow, 186 F. Supp. 618 (S. D. Cal. 1960).
80 Lerner Stores Corp. v. Lerner, 162 F. 2d 160 (9th Cir. 1947).
81 D & W Food Corp. v. Graham, supra n. 76.
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ant draws its trade8 2 Where the businesses are but a short dis-
tance apart but draw trade from different neighborhoods or
groups there is little likelihood of confusion and injunctive relief
will be denied.
8 3
In conformity with the protective attitude of the courts in
allowing an individual the use of his family name in connection
with his business, it was held that where defendant acquired a
furniture store, changed its name to his family name, and com-
peted with plaintiff's nearby store of the same name, there was
no unfair competition, although defendant was required to
change the store front and advertise that his business was not
connected with plaintiff's.
8 4
Charitable and Foreign Corporations
Most unfair competition cases involve the actual or possible
pecuniary loss of a profit making corporation at the hands of a
competitor who seeks to palm off his goods as those of the
prior user and thus obtain a free ride on the reputation, good
will, and advertising of the plaintiff. It is well settled, however,
that eleemosynary corporations are equally vested with the
right to protect their corporate name against either another
charitable organization,8 5 church, 6 educational institution,8 7 or
a business corporation8 8 seeking to establish a connection with
the prior user in the minds of the public.
Where all other necessary elements are present, a domestic
corporation may enjoin a foreign corporation from doing busi-
ness within the state under the same or a deceptively similar
name. The fact that a domestic corporation has incorporated
under the laws of a state does not ipso facto require that a foreign
82 Stern Furniture Co. v. Stern, 52 Ohio L. A. 527, 83 N. E. 2d 804, affd.
152 Ohio St. 191, 87 N. E. 2d 351 (1948).
83 Irene Beauty Shoppe v. Miss Irene, Inc., 254 A. D. 52, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 593
(1938).
84 Sachs Furniture and Radio Co. v. Sach's Quality Stores Corp., 120 A.
2d 477 (N. J. Super. 1956).
85 National Circle, Daughters of Isabella v. National Order of Daughters
of Isabelle, supra n. 58; See Anno., Right of Benevolent or Fraternal Society
or Organization to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar Name,
Insignia, or Ritual of Another Organization, 76 A. L. R. 2d 1396 (1961).
86 Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. 2d 979 (4th Cir. 1944).
87 John Roberts Mfg. Co. v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 258 F.
2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958).
88 Mayo Clinic v. Mayo's Drug & Cosmetic, Inc., supra n. 42.
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corporation having substantially the same name be excluded
from doing business in the state8 9 or in the locality of the plain-
tiff's business.9 0
A foreign corporation may, in a proper case, enjoin a
domestic corporation from pirating its name.0 ' The mere fact
that the domestic corporation has been granted a certificate
under the disputed name is not a defense to an equitable action
to enjoin its use of the name.92
Ordinarily a foreign corporation is denied access to the
state courts where it has been doing business in the state without
registering with the Secretary of State. However, where an
Ohio corporation had an agent in New York who solicited orders
and forwarded them to the home office in Ohio, it was not "doing
business" in New York and the Ohio corporation was not pre-
cluded from enjoining the use of a similar name by a domestic
corporation on the theory that plaintiff was doing business in
New York without authorization.9 3 In a recent case, a foreign
corporation which had been continuously in business for over
twenty-five years was denied a certificate to do business in
Florida because it had the same name as a domestic corporation.
It was successful, however, in enjoining the domestic corporation
from doing business under the deceptively similar name by re-
sorting to the federal courts.9 4 In a recent New York case it was
held that a Massachusetts corporation was entitled to enjoin a
New York corporation from using its name and it was no defense
that the Massachusetts corporation was not authorized to do
business in New York.9 5
Although the Secretary of State is not a judicial officer,96
it was not an abuse of discretion for the Secretary of State of
89 Sterling Products Corporation v. Sterling Products, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 548
(S. D. N. Y. 1942).
90 Kafafian v. Spotless Stores of New Jersey, Inc., supra n. 77.
91 Radio Shack Corporation v. Radio Shack, Inc. 180 F. 2d 200 (7th Cir.
1950); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, 21 F. Supp.
127 (N. D. Ill., E. D., 1948).
92 Oil Products Co. v. Oil Products Co., 104 P. L. J. 384 (Pa. Com. P1. 1957).
93 Peerless Electric Co. v. Peerless Electric, Inc., 135 N. Y. S. 2d 885
(Special Term 1954).
94 Seaboard Finance Co. v. Martin, 244 F. 2d 329 (5th Cir. 1957).
95 Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., 188 N. Y. S.
2d 132 (App. Div. 1959).
96 Darling Willis Avenues, Inc. v. Darling Discount Mart, Inc., 192 N. Y. S.
2d 527 (Special Term 1959).
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New York to refuse to accept for filing the statement of a
foreign corporation "Motor Club of America" in view of the
similarity to "Automobile Club of America" in use by an exist-
ing domestic corporation.97
Effect of Incorporation Under a Name
Mere incorporation under a name does not give defendant
the right to compete unfairly with another person or concern
using the same or a similar name.98 The fact that defendant's
corporate name included a phrase, use of which plaintiff sought to
enjoin, but which had been approved by the Secretary of State,
would not prevent allowance of an injunction.99
Ordinarily a corporate name will not be given equitable
protection unless there is a use of the name as well as appropria-
tion.100 It has been held that the issue in unfair competition
cases is not the time of adoption of the name but when the name
first made sufficient impact on the purchasing public such that
the required association arose between the name and its single
source.101 It would appear that the primary effect of incorpo-
ration under a name is to protect it against adoption by a subse-
quently formed corporation in the same state.10
Thus a trucking company incorporated under the name
"A & P Trucking Corporation" would not be afforded immunity
to an action by the retail food chain if the trucking corporation
adopted the name to compete unfairly or to deprecate the food
chain's good will and business reputation.10 3 Immunity does not
flow from incorporation where it appears that defendant's cor-
porate name was calculated to lead the public into believing that
defendant had an affiliation with plaintiff corporation. 10 4
Where defendant registered the trade names "Standard Oil
97 Motor Club of America v. Curran, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 733, 193 Misc. 157,
affd. 85 N. Y. S. 2d 552, 274 App. Div. 1083, appeal denied 87 N. Y. S. 2d
920, 275 App. Div. 727, affd. 299 N. Y. 776, 87 N. E. 2d 678, (1949).
98 Oil Products Co. v. Oil Products Co., supra n. 92.
99 Progressive Welder Co. v. Collom, 125 F. Supp. 307 (D. Minn. 1954).
100 Lawyer's Title Insurance Co. v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., supra
n. 61.
101 Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P. 2d 10 (Cal. App. 1959).
102 Smart Shop v. Colbert's, supra n. 78.
103 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Trucking Corp., 51 N. J.
Super. 412, 144 A. 2d 172 (1958).
104 Fox Fur Co. v. Fox Fur Co., 59 F. Supp. 12 (D. Md. 1944).
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of New England," "Standard Oil Company of New England," and
"Standard Oil of New Hampshire," this was not conclusive proof
that unfair competition did not exist, nor was defendant success-
ful in pleading that the name "Standard Oil" had been diluted
by use of other companies or that plaintiff had abandoned its
exclusive right to "Standard Oil" by emphasizing the name
"Esso." 105
The rule then, is that even though the corporation derives
its name through the authority of the state, that name cannot
be used in a manner which will result in fraud or deception, 106
nor does it enlarge the right to enjoin a competitor nor strengthen
the defense of an unfair user.10 7
Abandonment
Where a corporate or trade name has been abandoned the
name is immediately available for use by another corporation'"
so long as confusion and deception of the public will not re-
sult.10 9 In order to establish the defense of abandonment it is
necessary to show that it was the intent of the prior user of the
name to discontinue its use. Thus where plaintiff had ceased
doing business under the name "Turner's West Seattle Realty"
and operated under the names "Turner Realty" and "M. C.
Turner Realty Co.," intent to abandon was not shown because
after ceasing to use the original name he maintained two large
signs proclaiming "West Seattle Realty" on the business
premises." 0
Ordinarily where plaintiff fails to maintain an action against
other users of a similar corporate name or where businesses in
other parts of the country use the name, there is no abandonment
of the right to protection."' Where defendant had sold solid
105 Esso Standard Oil Company v. The Standard Oil Company of New
Hampshire, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 71 (D. N. H. 1958).
106 Dollar Department Stores of Mississippi, Inc. v. Laub, 120 So. 2d 139
(Miss. 1960).
107 Town Taxi Service Corp. v. Vet Cab, Inc., 104 N. Y. S. 2d 915 (Supreme
Ct., Monroe Cty. 1951).
108 Olympia Brewing Co. v. Northwest Brewing Co., 178 Wash. 533, 35 P.
2d 104 (1934).
109 Browning King Co. of New York, Inc. v. Browning King Co., 176 F.
2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1949).
110 Turner v. Gilmore, 314 P. 2d 658 (Wash. 1957), Holmes v. Border
Brokerage Co., supra n. 39.
111 Peerless Electric Co. v. Peerless Electric, Inc., supra n. 93; Precision
Apparatus Co. v. Precision Meter Co., 165 N. Y. S. 2d 853 (Special Term
1956).
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fuels under the name "Consumers Company of Illinois," but
made no protest when plaintiff commenced using the name "Con-
sumers" in connection with its fuel oil business, the defendant
thereby abandoned the right to use the name in connection with
a fuel oil business, and its silence for many years constituted
recognition of plaintiff's right to use the name. Defendant's
action in selling fuel oil under the name "Consumers" several
years after plaintiff's incorporation constituted unfair compe-
tition. 2
When a company ceases doing business, its trade name is
abandoned, and no rights in the name arise by a later sale of the
good will of the corporation as a separate item.113 However
where a corporation transfers all its assets to a new corporation,
the new corporation is entitled to use the name of the original
corporation. "
14
Where plaintiff had used its trade name in connection with
many of its food products for over thirty years, but only recently
used the name for olive oil, defendant could not avail himself of
the defense of abandonment in an action to enjoin the defendant
from using a similar name to market its olive oil.115
Laches
Laches is generally not a bar to injunctive relief against
unfair competition," 6 although it may bar an accounting for
profits. 11  However, where plaintiff has stood by while the de-
fendant built up a substantial business under the offending name,
courts of equity will not step in and destroy the defendant's
business.118 Thus where defendant knew of plaintiff's use of the
112 Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Consumers Company of Illinois, 169 F.
2d 153 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 406, 335 U. S. 902, 93 L. Ed. 437,
and 69 S. Ct. 408, 335 U. S. 902, 93 L. Ed. 437.
113 Browning King Co. of New York, Inc. v. Browning King Co., supra
n. 109.
114 Industrial Psychology, Inc. v. Simon, 226 N. Y. S. 2d 148 (App. Div.
1962).
115 Locatelli, Inc. v. Tomaiuoli, 129 F. Supp. 630 (D. N. J. 1955).
116 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Trucking Corp., supra
n. 103; American Shops, Inc. v. American Fashion Shops of Journal Square,
Inc., 13 N. J. Super. 416, 80 A. 2d 575 (1951).
117 Gerbron, Inc. v. Gerbron Cleaners, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 150 (E. D. Pa. 1942),
affd. 133 F. 2d 202.
118 The Seven-Up Company v. O-So Grape Co., Dwinell-Wright Co. v.
White House Milk Co., supra n. 59.
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name "Hershey's" in connection with ice cream products for
twenty years prior to commencing their action, and explained
their delay as content to let the economic laws of business com-
petition take care of the situation, the court denied injunctive
relief, allowing the parties to compete with each other and
content to let the laws of business competition take care of the
situation.1 9 Similarly, where plaintiff failed to object to de-
fendant's use of the name "Renotex" in connection with its
carpet cleaning business while merger talks were being carried
on, thus permitting defendant to believe plaintiff acquiesced in




While fraud or wrongful intent is not an essential element
of unfair competition, 1 21 relief is available in all cases where
fraud is practiced by one securing the trade of a rival dealer. 122
It has been said that the gravamen of the action of unfair com-
petition is the intent to deceive,'2 3 yet the absence of fraud is
not a defense to the equitable action of a prior appropriator of
the name to enjoin a subsequent user,1 24 although it may bar
an award of damages or an accounting of profits. 25 Defendant's
fraudulent conduct in pirating the trade of a competitor is highly
persuasive evidence that a confusing similarity exists.120
Where one knowingly adopts a trade or corporate name
119 Hershey Ice Cream Co. v. Hershey Creamery Corp. of New York, 158
N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Special Term, 1956), affd. 5 A. D. 2d 890, 173 N. Y. S.
2d 254.
120 Renofab Process Corp. v. Renotex Corp., 158 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (Trial Term,
1956).
121 National Design Center v. 53 Street Design Centre, 203 N. Y. S. 2d 517
(Special and Trial Term, 1960); Square D Co. v. Sorenson, 224 F. 2d 61
(7th Cir. 1955); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp.
250 (S. D. Cal. 1958), affd. 283 F. 2d 695, cert. den. 81 S. Ct. 903, 365 U. S.
869, 5 L. Ed. 2nd 859.
122 National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F. 2d 195 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. den.
76 S. Ct. 135, 350 U. S. 883, 100 L. Ed. 778.
123 Kay Jewelry Co. v. Gay's Jewelry, Inc., supra n. 34.
124 Duraloy Co. v. Duralloy Products Corp., 89 N. Y. S. 2d 164 (Special
Term 1949).
125 Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Consumers Company of Illinois, supra
n. 112.
126 Howards Clothes, Inc. v. Howard Clothes Corp., 52 N. W. 2d 753 (Minn.
1952).
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already in use, intent to mislead will be presumed. 127 However
the presumption is rebuttable by evidence that defendant acted
in good faith or with a proper motive. Thus where defendant
used the word "Triumph" in its corporate name and plaintiff
conducted his closely related business under the same name, the
use was held to be innocent because of defendant's desire to




Generally the prior user of a corporate name seeks to pre-
vent the junior appropriator from using the name to the detri-
ment of plaintiff's trade, reputation, or good will. In a proper
case this result is achieved by an injunction which absolutely
forbids the defendant to conduct his business under the disputed
name. 29 The corporate defendant is thus required to select a
new name if it desires to continue its business.1 30 More fre-
quently, however, the use of the offending name will not be
enjoined absolutely, relief being granted by causing defendant
to conduct his business in such a manner that probability of
confusion will be minimized. 13 ' Thus it has been held that add-
ing the words "of New York" to defendant's corporate name
would reasonably avoid confusing similarity,132 although it was
held that prefixion of defendant's proper name was not a suffici-
ent antidote to confusion between "Industrial Photo Service"
and "Kelley's Industrial Photo Services." 133 Where one is doing
business under his own name, the courts are reluctant to enjoin
absolutely the use of one's own name in conducting his busi-
127 American Shops, Inc. v. American Fashion Shops of Journal Square,
Inc., supra n. 116.
128 Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph International Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 169 (S. D. N. Y. 1960).
129 The National City Bank of Cleveland v. National City Window Clean-
ing Co., supra n. 18; Mayo Clinic v. Mayo's Drug & Cosmetic, Inc., supra
n. 42; Holmes v. Border Brokerage Co., Inc., supra n. 39; Lorraine Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Loraine Knitwear Co. Inc., supra n. 66.
130 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., supra
n. 51.
131 Chayt v. Darling Retail Shops Corp., 175 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1959).
132 Howard Clothes, Inc. v. Howard Clothes Corp., supra n. 126.
133 Industrial Photo Service, Inc. v. Kelly, supra n. 53.
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ness13 4 under the theory that a man's name is his own prop-
erty.13
5
Other examples of injunctive relief include a prohibition
against using the word "Esquire" other than in defendant's
corporate name, thus precluding its use on merchandise, labels,
containers, or in advertising; 136 requiring defendant to spell
out the full corporate name immediately next to the initials
"E-J," 137 requiring defendant to make changes in its print
type,138 or operate under its full name.139
Although a successful plaintiff is not ipso facto entitled to
damages or an accounting of profits in addition to an injunc-
tion,140 damages will be allowed in a proper case, as where
defendant's conduct is calculated to deceive the public into
believing it is purchasing the first user's product,1 4 1 or if
defendant's conduct has been fraudulent. 142 The basic rule of
damage in a case of unfair business competition is the amount
the plaintiff would have made except for the defendant's
wrong.143 Elements to be considered in assessing damages are
injury to plaintiff's reputation and good will, expenses such as
advertising to change its name to differentiate his product from
that of the wrongdoer, and reduced profits due to fewer sales
or sales at lower prices. 4 4 Attorney's fees will be awarded as
134 Hunt Potato Chip Co. v. Hunt, 164 N. E. 2d 335 (Mass. 1960).
135 John T. Lloyd Laboratories, Inc. v. Lloyd Brothers Pharmacists, Inc.,
131 F. 2d 703 (6th Cir. 1942).
136 Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Manufacturing Co., Inc., 243 F. 2d 540
(1st Cir. 1957).
137 Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. E. & J. Manufacturing Co., 263 F. 2d 254
(9th Cir. 1959).
138 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Liberty Insurance Company of Texas,
supra n. 6.
139 Henderson v. Henderson Funeral Home Corp., 320 S. W. 2d 113, (Ky.
1958).
140 Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., supra n. 91; City Messenger of
Hollywood, Inc. v. City Bonded Messenger Service, Inc., 254 F. 2d 531 (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. den. 79 S. Ct. 45, 358 U. S. 827, 3 L. Ed. 2d 66; Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Sklar, 75 F. Supp. 98 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
14 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 108 F. 2d 632 (6th Cir. 1940).
142 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F. 2d 538
(2d Cir. 1956); Fancee Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., supra
n. 68.
143 Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 153 N. Y. S. 2d 839 (App. Div. 1956),
rearg. den. 158 N. Y. S. 2d 781, 3 A. D. 2d 609, affd. 163 N. Y. S. 2d 781, 3
N. Y. 2d 757, 143 N. E. 2d 529.
144 Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960);
Fancee Free Mfg. Co. v. Fancy Free Fashions, Inc., supra n. 68.
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an element of damages when defendant's actions were uncon-
sionable, fraudulent, willful, in bad faith, or exceptional. 145
Damages are ordinarily confined to complainant's actual loss, 146
although punitive damages may be awarded,'1 47 but not in ex-
cessive amounts.1 48 Where the acts of defendant in palming off
their goods as those of plaintiff are willful and deliberate treble
damages may be awarded. 149 Good faith, while not a defense to
injunctive relief, is a defense to an action for damages and
profits.'5 0
An accounting of profits is not justified in a case of unfair
competition where proof of profits emanating from that source
would be speculative, 151 or where an injunction will satisfy the
equities of the case.15 2 It has been held that plaintiff's inability
to prove damages will not preclude recovery of defendant's
profits from sales unlawfully made, 153 although the contrary has
been held where the plaintiff failed to prove material damage.15 4
It has been said that in an action for unfair competition an
accounting of profits will not be ordered in the absence of an
express finding of fraud,155 intentional deception, "6 or wanton
misconduct. 157  Thus where defendant was notified by the
Secretary of State that a name was available when in fact it
was already in use,15 or where defendant took immediate steps
145 See cases cited Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., supra n. 144, at p. 222.
146 Kreisberg v. Wakefield Co., Inc., 165 N. Y. S. 2d 769 (Special Term 1957).
147 George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., 169 A. 2d 370 (R. I. 1961).
148 Henderson v. Henderson Funeral Home Corp., supra n. 139.
149 Powder Power Tool Corp. v. Powder Actuated Tool Co., Inc., 128 F.
Supp. 811 (N. D. Ill., E. D. 1955).
150 Donner v. Parker Credit Corp., 10 N. J. Super. 350, 76 A. 2d 277 (1950).
151 Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Gibson Lighter Mfg. Co., 159 N. Y. S.
2d 606 (App. Div. 1957), rearg. den. 3 A. D. 2d 833, 161 N. Y. S. 2d 829, 830.
152 City Messenger of Hollywood, Inc. v. City Bonded Messenger Service,
Inc., supra n. 140.
153 Warren, Inc. v. Turner's Gowns, Ltd., 285 N. Y. 62, 32 N. E. 2d 793
(1941); Robert Reis & Co. v. Herman B. Reiss, Inc., supra n. 38.
154 Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. The Chester Laurie, Ltd., 189 F. Supp. 98 (S. D.
N. Y. 1960); Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F. 2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953);
Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of Cal., Ltd., 60 F. Supp. 442 (D. Cal. 1945),
affd. 158 F. 2d 798, cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 1315, 331 U. S. 824, 91 L. Ed. 1940.
155 Bostitch, Inc. v. King Fastener Co., 140 A. 2d 274, rearg. den. 140 A. 2d
768 (R. I. 1958).
156 National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, supra n. 122.
157 Fuller Products Co. v. Fuller Brush Co., 299 F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1962).
158 Donner v. Parker Credit Corp., supra n. 150.
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to avoid confusion upon notice of infringement, 159 or adopted
a name in good faith,160 an accounting will not be ordered,
although such action is not a defense to an application for in-
junctive relief. Similarly where defendant's sales were to parties
who could not have been misled because of their position as
buyers for stores, and it was unlikely that any profit arose to
defendant as a result of the infringement, complainant was not
entitled to an accounting.' 6'
An infringer must account for profits even in areas where
he does not compete directly with the prior appropriator of a
name. Thus an order that defendant account in respect to de-
fendant's stores in areas where plaintiff did not have competing
stores was proper, where the trial judge found that defendant
adopted its trade name with knowledge of plaintiff's prior use.'62
159 Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., supra n. 91; American Shops,
Inc. v. American Fashion Shops of Journal Square, Inc., supra n. 116.
160 Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 174 N. Y. S. 2d 46 (Special Term 1958).
161 Lorraine Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Loraine Knitwear Co., Inc. supra n. 66.
162 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., supra n. 142.
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